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The Uniform Commercial Code
In Minnesota: Articles 2 and 6 -
Sales and Bulk Transfers-
This article is one of several being published to acquaint
Minnesota practitioners with the newly enacted Uniform
Commercial Code. Mr. Minish examines the Sales and
Bulk Sales Articles of the UCC and comments on their
relation to prior Minnesota Law.
Robert A. Minish*
ARTICLE 2. SALES
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code1 is "a complete re-
vision and modernization of the Uniform Sales Act .... " Article 2
is commonly referred to as the businessman's article because its
underlying premise is that the law should enforce the reasonable
expectations of businessmen. The extent of this revision and its
sheer bulk combined with loose drafting3 should be enough to dis-
may any practitioner accustomed to the present law. This dis-
cussion will attempt to lighten the burden by explaining the major
changes and innovations of article 2 and their significance for the
practitioner.4
*Afember of Mfinnesota Bar.
1. AArEmCAN LAW INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON UNIFORM LAWS,
UNIFORm COZMIsrCIAL CODE, 1962 OFFICIL TEXT WITH CO MENTS (1963)
[hereinafter cited as CODE; the official comments will be cited CODE § -,
comment]. The Code has been enacted in Minnesota and appears in MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 336.1-101 through § 336.10-105 (1965). Most references in the
text will be to the statutory Uniform Commercial Code which will be referred
to as Code in the text, but footnote references will be to the 1962 official text.
2. CODE § 2-101, comment. The Uniform Sales Act is in MINN. STAT. §§
512.01-.79 (1961).
3. One court, referring to § 2-207, said, "The statute is not too happily
drafted." Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir.
1962). But see 76 HE[Av. L. REv. 1481 (1963); 111 U. PA. L. REV. 132 (1962)
for critical evaluation of this court's approach to the Code.
4. The official comments after each section of the Code help to explain the
intent of the drafters and should be the first source consulted on any problem.
Anyone working with article 2 must always consider its relation to the other
articles. For example, article 1 sets forth general provisions that are applicable
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As enacted in Minnesota, article 2 contains no deviations from
the 1962 official text of the Code The article is divided into seven
parts, organized chronologically from the formation of the sales
contract through remedies upon breach.
PART 1. SHORT TITLE, GENmL CONSTRUCTION, AND SUBJECT
MATTER
A. Scope
Section 2-102 states, "this Article applies to transactions in
goods .. . ." Thus, the general scope of article 2 does not differ
materially from that of the Uniform Sales Act.7 Although trans-
actions that are in reality "security transactions"8 are excluded by
section 2-102, the sales aspects of such transactions are included.
Investment securities are excluded, but the provisions of article 2
may be applicable to transactions involving securities.9
The Code definition of goods expands somewhat the scope of
article 2. "Goods" is defined to mean all things movable, 0 as well
as the unborn young of animals, growing crops, 1 timber, minerals
and structures to be removed from the land if severance is to be
effected by the seller. 2
One ambiguity exists in regard to equipment leases. Presum-
ably, such leases are not included in article 2 since the title of the
article refers to sales and the definition of a sale refers to the
passing of title.'8 However, where a lease contemplates ultimate
to all articles. Many of the definitions contained in § 1-201 will be particularly
relevant. See generally, Kinyon, The Uniform Commercial Code in Minnesota.
Introduction and Proviions of Articles 1 and 10, 50 MINN. L. REv. - (1965).
5. See Mm-. STAT. ANN. ch. 336.9 (Temp. pamph. 1965).
6. The entire wealth of law review articles and comments on article 2 can
be used without fear of local variations. See the "Selected Bibliography" at the
end of this article.
7. See A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM CoMMRcIm CODE ON MI -
NESOTA LAW 47 (1964) [hereinafter cited in footnotes as MIN. STUDY and re-
ferred to in text as Minnesota Study].
8. These are covered by article 9. CODE § 2-102, comment.
9. CODE § 2!-105 defines "goods" to exclude investment securities, which are
covered by article 8, but the comment to this section explains that any provi-
sion of article 2 may, where appropriate, be applied by analogy to situations
not specifically covered by the provisions of article 8.
10. CODE § 2-105.
11. Compare MNN . STAT. § 512.76(1) (1961), which in defining "Goods"
used the term "chattels personal" and specified it included emblements and
industrial growing crops.
12. § 2-107(1). Whether such items were regarded as goods under the Uni-
form Sales Act was uncertain. See MmN. STUDY 55.
13. CODE § 2-106(1).
ARTICLES 2 AND 6
ownership by the lessee through an option to purchase at the end
of the term upon payment of a minimal sum, it may be regarded
for some purposes as a conditional sale rather than a lease.14
Arguably, such a lease arrangement would be a secured trans-
action with article 2 applicable to its sales aspects.
B. Dual Standard for Merchants and Nonmerchants
One major and controversial change in the article is the adop-
tion of a dual standard for merchants and nonmerchants. 5 This
approach, an innovation in Anglo-American law, originated with
Napoleon's Code de Commerce.' Williston was quite critical of
this innovation and argued if a person engaged in mercantile
transactions 'he is, under the present law, and should continue
to be, entitled to the same rights and subject to the same duties
as if he were a merchant.1117
The practitioner should always be alert to the differing results
that may follow if any of the parties to a transaction is a merchant
under the Code. The potentiality for confusion inherent in this
dual standard is increased by the ambiguity in the definition of
merchant. A merchant is not only "a person who deals in goods
of the kind" but also one who "otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction . .. ."'s Determining whether
a person held himself out as having such knowledge or skill pre-
sents a close question, which may have to be resolved by litiga-
tion."' The comment to section 2-104 is some help, for it attempts
to classify the special provisions relating to merchants.
14. See Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 39, which indicates factors
that may warrant treatment of such transactions for tax purposes as a sale
rather than a lease.
15. See CODE § 2-104, comment, for a catalogue of the 14 sections contain-
ing special provisions relating to merchants.
16. Corman, The Law of Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17
RUTGERs L. REv. 14, 16 (1962). Cf. M1Nn. STUDy 50, which describes two
instances of a dual standard used in the Uniform Sales Act.
17. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
63 Htnv. L. REv. 561, 573 (1950).
18. CODE § 2-104(1).
19. See Victor v. Barzaleski, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 698 (Luzerne County Ct.
1959) (whether general maintenance man installing a heating system was a
merchant); Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luzerne Leg. Reg. Rep. 159 (C.P.
Pa. 1962) (hardware dealer regularly selling shotguns a merchant bound by
warranty); Fox Pools, Inc. v. Villarose, 77 York Leg. Rec. 165 (C.P. Pa. 1963)
(dealer selling swimming pool a merchant); see also Hall, Article 2-Sales-
"From Status to Contract"?, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 209, 212, indicates that there
may be confusion as to the applicable rule where one or more parties to the
1965]
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PART 2. FoRMn, FORMuATION, AND READJUSTvMNT OF CONTRACT
A. Statute of Frauds
The liberalization of the formal requirements needed to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds2° ranks as one of the most important fea-
tures of the Sales article. A difference of opinion exists as to
whether this is a change for the better 21 Nevertheless, it is certain
to have an impact upon commercial practice in Minnesota.
1. Transactions Covered
The Statute of Frauds in article 2 applies only to the sale of
goods and does not include choses in action.22 The number of
transactions subject to the written memorandum requirement of
the Statute is decreased because the dollar amount has been in-
creased from fifty to five hundred dollars. Since the monetary
minimum is stated in terms of "price" instead of "value,"' 3 there
may be more certainty as to whether a transaction is subject to
the Statute of Frauds.
2. Memorandum
Under the Uniform Sales Act, a writing or memorandum that
would satisfy the Statute of Frauds was required to state accu-
rately all of the essential terms of the agreement 4 Section
2-201 (1) is much easier to satisfy; the writing need only "indicate
that a contract for sale has been made between the parties .... "
Only the quantity term of the contract must be included in the
writing, since the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity
shown. Other terms such as price, time and place of delivery, and
transaction are not merchants. Holahan, Contract Formalities and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 3 Vna. L. REv. 1, 23 (1957), states that "it is highly likely
that there will be litigation over who is a 'merchant'; it may often be a jury
question."
20. See CODE § 2-201.
21. See Corman, supra note 16, at 19.
92. The Code provides separate Statutes of Frauds for documentary choses
in action, § 8-319 (securities), § 9-203 (secured transactions) and for nondocu-
mentary choses in action such as simple contract rights, § 1-206.
23. 1 HAwxIAm, A TRASACTIONAL Gums TO THE UNIFORM COlE.nmRCALI
CODE 23-24 (1964) [hereinafter cited TRAusAcrioNA GUmE] discusses this
change and concludes that "it is likely, therefore, that no change was intended
in the employment of the word 'price' in section 2-201." He feels that value
and price can mean the same thing since under § 2-304(1) price can be made
payable in "money ... or otherwise."
24. Union Hay Co. v. Des Moines Flour & Feed Co., 159 Minn. 106, 198
N.W. 312 (1924); MMnu. STuDY 57.
ARTICLES 2 AND 6
time and place of payment can be established by a court under
authority of the Code25 with the aid of the parol evidence avail-
able. 26
A great improvement in Minnesota sales law is the provision
that the Statute of Frauds is satisfied if the writing is signed by
the party "against whom enforcement is sought or by his author-
ized agent or broker.127 Under the Uniform Sales Act, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court held that a contract evidenced by a written
memorandum could not be enforced against the party to be
charged unless it was also signed by the party relying on the
memorandum. 8
3. Letters of Confirmation
The Code provides for certainty with respect to contract terms
by sanctioning the common commercial practice of writing letters
of confirmation of oral agreements. Under the old law, a letter of
confirmation bound the sender, but not the recipient. Now, be-
tween merchants, a written confirmation of a contract sent within
a reasonable time will satisfy the Statute of Frauds unless written
objection is given within ten days after receipt.F9 The burden of
proof as to the terms of the contract remains the same. 0 If an
objection is made, then the letter of confirmation should not
satisfy the Statute of Frauds as to either party. 1 Thus, lawyers
should counsel their commercial clients to send letters confirming
the terms of all their oral contracts. Likewise, clients should be
advised to review carefully the letters of confirmation they re-
ceive and object in writing where the terms are not as agreed upon.
4. Part Performance
The sending of letters of confirmation becomes even more im-
25. See CoDE § 2-305 (open price term); § 2-308 (delivery); § 2-309 (time
of shipment or delivery); § 2-310 (time of payment).
26. CODE § 2-202.
27. CODE § 2-201(1).
28. Peterson v. New England Furniture & Carpet Co., 210 Minn. 449, 299
N.W. 208 (1941). See MnN. STUdY 57.
29. CODE § 2-201(2).
30. See CODE § 2-201, comment 3.
31. Certainly a letter of confirmation cannot bind the recipient who ob-
jected to it; likewise, the recipient should not be able to both object to the
letter of confirmation and assert that it is binding on the sender. See HAWn-
LAND, SALES AND BuLx SALES 28-29 (1958) [hereinafter cited SALES .m BurD
SALES]. TRANSACTIONAL GuIDE 26 states positively that if there is an objec-
tion, both parties can assert the Statute of Frauds as a defense. But see Cor-
man, supra note 16, at 21.
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portant in view of the Code's limitation on part performance as a
means of satisfying the Statute. Under the Uniform Sales Act, if
the buyer accepted part of the goods or made a part payment, the
entire oral contract was enforceable!'2 Under the Code, part per-
formance makes the contract enforceable only to the extent to
which goods have been accepted or payment made 3 The reason
for this change is that while part performance is "an unambiguous
overt admission by both parties that a contract actually exists,"34
it does not establish the quantity term, except by the actual ac-
ceptance and receipt of the goods or by the payment made.3 5
5. Admissions
An admission that a contract for sale was made, contained in
a pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court, will now satisfy the
Statute of Frauds26 This provision raises several problems. First,
does the making of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
on which relief may be granted constitute an admission "that a
contract for sale was made" so as to preclude the assertion of the
Statute of Frauds as a defense? A Pennsylvania court ruled that
an admission for purposes of this section had to be made in a
responsive pleading s7 This seems a desirable result; otherwise a
defendant could not make such a motion where the Statute of
Frauds was involved .3  Second, may the plaintiff force the de-
fendant to admit, at trial under threat of perjury, the making
of a contract? Hawkland advises plaintiffs to try this tactic, con-
tending that only the "welsher" is protected if compelled admis-
sions are not permitted, since in the absence of a contract a
defendant can deny its existence and assert the Statute of
Frauds 9 Third, the Code does not specify when an admission is
made "otherwise in court." Thus it is not clear if the admission
must be made during the trial or may be made during pretrial
procedures. The more liberal construction, extending the admis-
sion rule to pretrial proceedings, seems most consistent with the
purpose of this section, to prevent a party from admitting the
contract in court and still asserting the Statute as a defense. 0
32. Bundy v. oelker, 145 inn. 19,175 N.W. 1000 (1920); MwN. SrUDY 58.
33. See CODE § 2-201(3)(c).
34. CODE § 2-201, comment 2.
35. TPNSAcTIOxAL GUIDE 27-28.
36. See CODE § 2-201(3)(b).
37. Beter v. Helman, 41 West. 7 (Pa. 1958).
38. See TRANSACTIONAL GuIDE 30.
39. Ibid.
40. See CODE § 2-201, comment 7.
ARTICLES 2 AND 6
B. Formation in General
In contrast to the Uniform Sales Act, article 2 sets forth rules
relating to the formation of sales contracts. In many instances
these rules make significant changes in contract law. 1 Section
2-204 establishes the general policy of the Code, which is to re-
gard the parties as having entered into a contract when their con-
duct indicates an intention to be bound, even if certain terms are
missing.4 2 Thus, a contract "does not fail for indefiniteness if the
parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."4 3 The main con-
sideration to remember is that while the Code does not create a
contract where none existed, it will give effect to conduct showing
an intention to make a binding agreement, even if all of the terms
are not spelled out. This constitutes a marked departure from the
prior law that required agreement between the parties on all
essential terms.44
1. Firm Offers
Businessmen tend to regard a firm offer as being what it
purports to be, an offer that cannot be revoked for a certain period
of time.45 Among lawyers and the courts a different philosophy
has prevailed. Basic contract law makes it clear that a party's
promise to keep an offer open is not binding without considera-
tion. 6 Section 2-205 makes a firm offer by a merchant enforceable
even if not supported by consideration. The offer must be made
in writing and signed47 by the merchant. He cannot be trapped
into making a firm offer by signing a form supplied by the offeree,
since the firm offer provision must be signed separately to be
enforceable.
The time during which the offer remains firm is limited to
three months.48 If an offer is stated to remain open for longer than
three months, it does not thereby become immediately revokable,
41. See generally Hawkland, Major Changes Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code in the Formation and Terms of Sales Contracts, 10 PRAc. LAW. 73
(May 1964).
42. See CODE § 2-204(3).
48. Ibid.
44. Mnuw. STUDY 63.
45. Hawkland, supra note 41, at 74.
46. M m. STUDY 64.
47. See CODE § 1-201(39), and the comment thereto for definition of
"signed."
48. The expiration time should be stated precisely, rather than in terms
of the number of days the offer will remain firm.
1965]
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but remains firm for three months 9 Of course, offers can be made
irrevokable for longer periods if supported by consideration.
2. Offer and Acceptance
Section 2-206 eliminates any technical common law rules
governing the mode of acceptance where the offer does not specify
a particular mode.5° "Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated,"
acceptance may be made in any manner and by any reasonable
medium.5 1
Section 2-206(1) (b) is designed to prevent the "unilateral con-
tract trick," whereby a seller who accepted a contract by shipping
nonconforming goods could successfully defend a suit for breach
by arguing that the shipment was not an acceptance because the
goods were nonconforming.5 - Under the Code such a shipment
of nonconforming goods will constitute both an acceptance of the
contract and a breach, unless "the seller seasonably notifies the
buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to
the buyer."53 Consequently, clients should be advised to give
notice to the buyer when they ship nonconforming goods as an
accommodation.
3. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation -The
Battle of Conflicting Forms
Under present contract law an acceptance must be a "mirror
image" of the offer; an acceptance containing different or addi-
tional terms is not an acceptance but a counteroffer5 Thus,
in a typical commercial transaction where buyer and seller use
conflicting forms, the parties have not made an enforceable con-
tract.55 This comes as a surprise to most businessmen, who believe
an exchange of forms closes a deal. Section 2-207 makes a signifi-
cant departure from common law and adopts the viewpoint of
businessmen that this exchange of forms is an enforceable
contract.
49. CODE § 2-205, comment 3; Hawkland, supra note 41, at 75.
50. The Minnesota Study states that no Minnesota cases deal with the
effectiveness of a particular means of acceptance. M~na. STUDy 66. However,
as a general rule, the question of whether the means adopted was authorized
was one of fact. 1 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS § 83 (3d ed., Jaeger ed. 1957).
51. CODE § 2-206(1).
52. MiNN. STUDy 66; TRANSACTIONAL GUME 33.
53. CODE § 206(b).
54. Min-. STUDY 68.
55. Hawldand describes the various gambits possible in the exchange of
forms. TRANSACTiONAL GUIDE 8-19.
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The approach is twofold. First, it provides a means to deter-
mine whether the parties, by their exchange of forms, have made
a contract. An enforceable contract results only if the negotiations
reflect "a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation" of the offer. Second, if a contract exists, the
means for defining its terms are prescribed. When there is a con-
tract, the terms are those stated in the offer56 and additional terms
are regarded as proposed additions to the contract. However, be-
tween merchants the additional terms become part of the contract
unless: (1) the offer limits acceptance to its terms; (2) the addi-
tional terms materially alter the contract; or (3) notice of objec-
tion is given.
7
A significant problem in defining the terms of the contract will
be the determination of which terms in an acceptance will ma-
terially alter the offer. The comment gives some examples which
would "result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without ex-
press awareness of the other party ...," such as negating the
warranty of merchantability. In a leading New York case, decided
under pre-Code law, the court said it would regard a provision for
arbitration contained in a seller's acknowledgment form as a
material alteration under the Code and not a part of the con-
tract.59 On the other hand, in a much criticized decision, the First
Circuit stated that a disclaimer of warranties in a seller's acknowl-
edgment was a material alteration, but still allowed the disclaimer
to become part of the contract.60 From a counseling stand-
point, the determination of whether a certain term would be a
material alteration cannot be made with certainty. Clients should
not assume that an additional term in an acceptance or acknowl-
edgment form, objectionable to them, is a material alteration that
56. See Davenport, "How to Handle the Battle of the Forms Under the
Uniform Commercial Code," A.B.A. Law Notes for the General Practitioner,
April, 1965, for suggested language to insert in the offer and acceptance.
57. CODE § 2--207(2).
58. CODE § 2-207, comment 4.
59. Application of Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 App. Div. 9d 216, 233
N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962). This case presents a classic illustration of the battle of
the forms. The court's characterization of the transaction was that "the buyer
and seller accomplished a legal equivalent to the irresistible force colliding
with the immovable object." Id. at 216-17, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
60. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
Here, the goods were shipped and accepted by the buyer, who argued that the
acknowledgment was an acceptance, but that the disclaimer was a material
alteration and not a part of the contract. The court said that such a result
would be an "absurdity," because if a binding contract existed, the offeror
would not assent to new terms. For criticism of this reasoning see 1 TiSAx-
ACTIONAL GuiDE 16; Corman, supra note 16, at 25; 76 HARv. L. REv. 1481
(1962); Ill U. PA. L. Rv. 132 (1962).
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will not become part of the contract. To be certain that the term
will not become part of the agreement, they should object to it.
Where the parties have numerous dealings and wish to avoid the
problems of conflicting forms altogether, they may execute an
overriding agreement that will govern all their dealings.
When there is an exchange of forms, the Code eliminates the
seller's option to conclude a contract on the terms stated in
his acknowledgment by shipping the goods.6 Under the old law,
while any additional terms in the acknowledgment made it a
counteroffer, if the seller shipped the goods and the buyer ac-
cepted, a contract was formed on the terms stated in the acknowl-
edgment. Under section 2-207(3), the shipment and acceptance
of the goods would constitute "conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of a contract .... ." The terms of the
contract would be those upon which the parties agreed, 2 as evi-
denced by the forms exchanged and any terms supplied by the
Code.63
4. Modification of Existing Contracts
The Code makes inroads on the doctrine of consideration in
this area. For example, under section 2-209 a modification of an
existing contract is enforceable without consideration. Formerly,
a promise to perform an existing obligation was not consideration
and would not support a modification of the contract,"4 even when
commercial necessity, such as a falling market, made modifica-
tion essential to secure performance. 65 Protection against one
party extorting a modification is provided by the general obliga-
tion of good faith,66 by allowing the contract to prohibit modifica-
tion unless made in writing,67 and by the Statute of Frauds if the
contract as modified is within its provisions.0 8 This protection
may be undercut by the provision that an attempt at modification
61, See TRANSACTIOxAL Gumn 18-19.
62. The parties must agree on the quantity term, since the Code makes
no provision for determining this.
63. For example, if the parties did not agree on the warranty term, the
implied warranties of the Code would become part of -the contract. CODE §§
2-314 & 2-315; TRANSACTIONAL GUmIE 18-19.
64. Mnm. STuDY 72.
65. See Hawkland, supra note 41, at 76-77, which states that in most
situations the party acting in good faith was the one who suffered most by
this rule.
66. See CODE § 1-203. See also CODE § 2-103(1)(b).
67. CODE § 2-209(2).
68. CODE § 2-209(3).
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may operate as a waiver.6 9 However, a waiver may be retracted
unless there has been reliance on it.70
PART 3. GENERAL OBLIGATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT
Part 3 deals with general obligations of the parties and the
construction of contracts. One controversial provision is the prohi-
bition on unconscionable contracts. Under the Code, a court may
refuse to enforce or modify a contract or contract provision that
is unconscionable in light of its commercial setting,7' purpose, and
effect.72 Despite the language about commercial setting the appli-
cation of this section is not limited to merchants. While this
section has been criticized as a startling and controversial inno-
vation impairing freedom of contract," the drafters of the Code
merely intended to make explicit a power courts have long exer-
cisedV 4 It does not represent a major departure from prior Minne-
sota law.75
A possible difficulty with this section is the fact that uncon-
scionability goes undefined. Hawkland suggests the cases cited in
the official comment, most of which involve warranty disclaimers
and limitations on remedies, are helpful in determining what the
drafters meant by "unconscionable. ' 76 One court has held a con-
tract unconscionable because of a great disparity between the
price and the value of the goods.77
A. Open Price Term
The Code approach to the formation of sales contracts is that
the one essential requirement of a contract is a definite expression
of an intent to be bound. Even if all the terms are not set forth,
69. CODE § 2-209(4); See TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE 162-64.
70. CODE § 2-209(5).
71. CODE § 2-302(1).
72. CODE § 2-302(P).
73. The Transactional Guide summarizes this criticism. TRANSAC TiONAL
GumE 44-45. See also Corman, The Law of Sales Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 14, 27 (1962).
74. CODE § 2-302, comment 1.
75. M ni. STUD 78.
76. TRANSA TIONAL GUIDE 47.
77. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 432, 201
A.2d 886 (1964). Under the contract the seller was to install siding on a
house. In a suit by the seller after the buyer cancelled, the court refused to
enforce the contract because the value of the goods was less than half the total
price. Denklin v. Sterner, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 203, 70 York Leg. Rec. 105 (C.P.
1956), held a large liquidated damages provision unconscionable.
1965]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:103
the contract will not fail for indefiniteness. Section 2-305 provides
that if the parties intend to be bound but leave the price term
open, a contract exists with the price "a reasonable price at the
time for delivery. 78 This eliminates any confusion that existed
under the Uniform Sales Act79 and conforms to commercial prac-
tices.s0 If the contract gives one of the parties the power to fix
the price, the Code imposes on him the duty of acting in good
faith so the contract will not fail for lack of mutuality.s' Where
the contract is completely silent as to price, a factual question
arises as to whether the parties intended to be bound."' To avoid
confusion and difficult problems of proof when the parties want
to leave the price term open, they should specify an intention to
be bound before the price is determined.8 s
B. Delivery and Payment
As is the case in the Uniform Sales Act, section 9-307 requires
that goods must be delivered at one time rather than in install-
ments, "unless otherwise agreed." An exception is permitted in
circumstances where "it is not commercially feasible to deliver
or receive the goods in a single lot."8 4 Since these circumstances
cannot be determined with any definiteness, it is wise to specify
in the contract if delivery may be made in installments.
Under the Uniform Sales Act payment and delivery are con-
current conditions, so payment is normally due upon delivery to
the carrier."5 Section 2-310 changes this rule to conform to the
commercial practice that "payment is due at the time and place
at which the buyer is to receive the goods."
C. Warranty
1. Quiet Possession
The Code makes several changes in the law of warranties. A
relatively minor change is the elimination of the warranty of
quiet possession as a separate warranty and the inclusion of it
78. Similar flexibility is allowed for the "particulars of performance." See
CODE § 2-311(1).
79. The Minnesota Study explains that it is not clear under present Minne-
sota law "as to just how 'open' the price term may be. .. ."MN. STUDY 82.
80. Corman, supra note 73, at 28.
81. CODE § 2-305(2).
82. CODE § 9-305, comment 2.
83. TRANsACTIONAIL GUIDE 57.
84. CoDE § 2-307, comment 3.
85. MmnN. STAT. § 512.42 (1961).
ARTICLES 2 AND 6
with the warranty of title."6 While this benefits sellers because
suit for breach of this warranty must be brought within four
years of the sale,8 7 it may prejudice some buyers, since the statute
of limitations could expire before the buyer's possession was dis-
turbed.""
2. Creation and Scope
In general, the changes relating to the creation and the scope
of warranties will have little effect on Minnesota law. 9 Two im-
plied warranties of the Uniform Sales Act, that goods sold by de-
scription shall conform to the description and that goods sold on the
basis of a sample shall conform to that sample, are made express
warranties under section 2-313. The implied warranty of mer-
chantability when the seller is a merchant dealing in goods of the
kind and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
are continued by sections 2-314 and 2-315. The Code attempts
to define the requisites of merchantability,"0 and sales of food and
drink are specifically covered."-
3. Warranty Disclaimers
The Code's attitude toward warranty disclaimers is quite
strict. The most important restriction is that disclaimers must
be conspicuous.9 2 To be avoided, the warranty of merchantability
must be specifically mentioned in a disclaimer and, if made in
writing, must be conspicuous.93 The warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose must be conspicuously disclaimed in writing.94
The conspicuousness requirement calls for careful drafting of
a disclaimer.98 Because the Code makes certain implied warranties
86. CODE § 2-312, comment 1.
87. ConE § 2-725(2) states that a breach of warranty occurs when tender
of delivery is made.
88. Compare TRANSACTIONAL Gum 93 with Hall, Article 2-Sales-
"From Status to Contract"?, 1952 Wis. L. Rsv. 209, 215-16, as to the de-
sirability of this provision.
89. See MmNn. STUDY 93-100.
90. CODE § 2-314(2), comment 6, offers a definition that is not meant to
be exhaustive.
91. Cons § 2-314(1). These warranties do not extend to the furnishing of
services. Cf. Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 132
N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1965).
92. See COD § 1-201(10) for the definition of conspicuous.
93. CODE § 2-316(2).
94. Ibid.
95. Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Mafley, 329 F.2d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964),
stated that a disclaimer of fitness made in -the same color ink and same size
print as the other provisions was not conspicuous.
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into express warranties, the disclaimer should refer to both express
and implied warranties. In drafting a disclaimer, attorneys should
also consider including a limitation or exclusion of consequential
damages." However, such a limitation, as well as any oppressive
disclaimer, is subject to the prohibition against unconscionable
contracts. 7 Furthermore, any limitation on consequential dam-
ages for personal injuries in the case of consumer goods is "prima
facie unconscionable." ' Where a conflict between an express
warranty and a disclaimer arises, the two provisions are to be
construed as consistent with each other, whenever possible; other-
wise the warranty is given effect0 9
4. Privity
Section 2-318 is intended to avoid most of the controversy
about the privity limitation. It extends warranty protection only
to persons in the buyer's family or household and his house guests;
it does not alter Minnesota law. '0 The Code intends to otherwise
remain neutral on the question of whether the privity require-
ment should be abolished as to "other persons in the distributive
chain."''1 Despite the Code's avowed neutrality, some cornmen-
tators believe section 2-318 will curb the trend away from the
privity requirement. 02
5. Mercantile Terms
Sections 2-319 through 2-325 deal with various mercantile
terms such as F.O.B., C.I.F., letters of credit and the like. These
terms and the obligations of the parties in each instance are de-
fined in light of present commercial practice. Parties desiring to
use any of these terms in agreements can now be certain of their
meaning.
96. See CoDE§ 2-719(3).
97. CODE § 2-302. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (dicta), held an automobile manufacturer's disclaimer of
an implied warranty of merchantability to be unconscionable as against a
purchaser's suit for personal injuries caused by a defective part. See TaRs-
ACTioNAL GUIDE 80-85, for the view that this disclaimer is unconscionable be-
cause it produces surprise results, not because it is oppressive.
98. CODE § 2-719(3).
99. CODE § 2-316(1).
100. MniN. STUDy 104. An employee will not be regarded as within this
category. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
101. CODE § 2-318, comment 3; see also CODE § 2-313, comment 2.
102. Comment, 4 NATURAL REsouRCES J. 626, 632 (1965). For this reason
California did not enact § 2-318.
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6. Sales on Consignment
The reservation of title in the seller by a sale on consignment
to a person dealing in goods of the kind will no longer by itself
protect the property from the reach of the buyer's creditors' 0
8
The seller must file under article 9 or be able to establish knowl-
edge by the creditors that the buyer was "substantially engaged
in selling the goods of others."'" 4 Thus, where clients are selling
goods on consignment, they should be advised to comply with
the filing requirements of article 9. Likewise anyone financing
inventory of a consignee should be advised to search the financing
statements filed under article 9.
PART 4. TITLE, CREDITORS AND GOOD FAITH PuRcHAsms
A. De-emphasis of Title
Under the Uniform Sales Act, locating title determined which
party to the transaction had various rights or duties such as risk
of loss or an insurable interest. A significant change wrought by
the Code is a de-emphasis of title. 05 Rather than solving all prob-
lems by reference to title, specific provisions determine such
things as the risk of loss or existence of an insurable interest. Con-
sequently, the lawyer dealing with a problem in this area should
look first at the specific provisions of article 2 to see if they apply
to the particular problem. Only if no specific provision is appli-
cable will the location of title become important. Then section
2-401 should be consulted, for it states when title passes from
the seller to the buyer.
The rules for determining when title passes are generally con-
sistent with present law. However, they are now rules of law,
rather than presumptions as they were under the Uniform Sales
Act.10 The goods must have been identified to the contract before
title can pass.' 7 It passes when the seller "commits himself,"
which, depending on the terms of the contract, may consist of
shipment, delivery of documents, or making the contract' 08 Under
103. See CODE § 2-326(3).
104. CODE § 2-326(3)(b).
105. See Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15
N.Y.U.L. REV. 159 (1938), for the explanation of and genesis for this change.
But see Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code, 63 11Mv. L. Rzv. 561, 570-71 (1950), for severe criticism of this section.
106. Mn-W. STAT. § 512.19 (1961).
107. CODE § 2-501 defines the manner in which goods may be identified to
the contract.
108. CODE § 2-401, comments 2, 4.
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the Code the rules of title passage can only be varied by explicit
agreement; 10 9 whereas the intent of the parties, as determined by
the terms of the contract and the acts and conduct of the parties
at the time of the transaction, formerly determined when title
passed."'
B. Purchase by a Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Business
Section 2-403(9) makes a significant and controversial change
with respect to buyers in the ordinary course of business. This
section provides "any entrusting of possession of goods to a mer-
chant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer
all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course of
business." A typical example used by commentators is that of a
person leaving a watch for repair with a jeweler. Under this sec-
tion, if the jeweler sells the watch in the ordinary course of busi-
ness to a purchaser in good faith who has no knowledge that the
watch has only been entrusted to the jeweler, the purchaser will
have good title. As between the innocent parties (i.e., the person
entrusting the merchant with possession and the buyer in the
ordinary course of business) the buyer is protected by the Code.
Of course, if the goods are stolen and then entrusted to a mer-
chant, the buyer would not receive good title, since the seller can
only transfer the rights of the entruster.
A less controversial change is made by section 2-403(1). Under
present law payment by check is conditional payment until the
check is cashed. If a bad check is given, the seller can reclaim
the goods even from a subsequent good faith purchaser."' Under
the Code the good faith purchaser for value is protected against
the original seller, despite the existence of a bad check."'
PART 5. PERFORMANCE
A. Forced Breach
This part defines and clarifies many rules relating to perform-
ance of the contract. Most of the provisions are derived from
present commercial practice and make few changes. Two changes
109. CoD § 2-401(1).
110. Haugen v. Dick Thayer Motor Co., 253 Minn. 199, 91 N.W.2d 585
(1958); MINN. STUDY 118-19.
111. This section was intended primarily for consignment sales and trans-
actions where a seller retained a security interest in the goods. In those situa-
tions it does not change present law. See SALEs AND BuLx SALEs 106-07.
112. MINN. STUDY 125.
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that have been made are designed to prevent "forced breaches,"
whereby a party desiring to break a disadvantageous contract and
avoid damages forces the other party to breach the contract first.
Under section 2-511(2), the seller cannot force the buyer into a
breach by unexpectedly demanding cash at the time of delivery,
since the seller must grant "any extension of time reasonably
necessary to procure it." Similarly, the buyer cannot force the
seller into a breach by "fly-specking" and rejecting the goods as
nonconforming. Section 2-508 gives the seller an absolute right,
upon "seasonable" notice, to cure the defect before the time for
performance has expired." 3 In the case of a "surprise rejection,"
the seller is allowed a reasonable time for cure after the time for
performance expires.
B. Risk of Loss
The specific rules relating to risk of loss vary, depending upon
whether there has been a breach. Section 2-509 governs risk of
loss in the absence of breach. Special rules apply where the goods
are shipped by carrier or held by a bailee for delivery without
being moved. Otherwise, if the seller is a merchant the risk of loss
passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods. If the seller is not
a merchant, the risk passes on "tender of delivery." These rules
should be considered in drafting contracts since they "are subject
to contrary agreement." Where a party has breached the contract
he will bear the risk of loss to the extent that it exceeds the other
party's effective insurance coverage calculated without regard
to subrogation rights."4
PART 6. BREACH, REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE
The Code codifies the present law requiring the seller to make
perfect tender. Section 2-601 states that if the goods are noncon-
forming in any respect, the buyer may reject all, accept all, or
accept part and reject part. The severity of this requirement of
strict performance is alleviated somewhat by the seller's right to
cure under section 2-508. Between merchants the seller has some
protection by virtue of section 2-605(1). Under this section, if
the buyer rejects nonconforming goods, the seller has the right
to request a written statement of all defects on which the buyer
113. If the notice of intent to cure is given after the buyer has changed
his position, the notice may not be regarded as seasonable. Corman, supra
note 73, at 40.
114. CODE § 2-510, comment 3.
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proposes to rely. If the buyer fails to state a defect "which is ascer-
tainable by reasonable inspection," he cannot later rely upon it to
justify the rejection. The buyer's right of rejection is also curtailed
with respect to installment contracts. He can reject an installment
of nonconforming goods only if the defect substantially impairs
the value of the installment and cannot be cured." 5 If the defect
substantially impairs the value of the whole contract, there is a
breach of the whole.
The manner in which the buyer can reject the goods is detailed
in section 2-602. The buyer must follow this section carefully, for
an ineffective rejection is an acceptance under section 2-606(1) (b).
Where the goods are perishable or "threaten to decline in value
speedily" unless the seller instructs otherwise, the buyer must
make a reasonable effort to sell them for the seller's account.",
A buyer who revokes his acceptance of nonconforming goods "has
the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if
he had rejected them.""17 Thus, the buyer and his lawyer no
longer are forced to elect between rescission and damages.
The right of a party to withhold performance and demand
assurance of performance from the other party is considerably
broadened. Under section 2-609(1) if "reasonable grounds for
insecurity arise" a party may demand adequate assurance of per-
formance and suspend his performance, if commercially reason-
able, until he receives such assurance. Between merchants, the
reasonable grounds for insecurity as well as the determination of
what is adequate assurance of performance are to be defined by
commercial standards and "need not arise from or be directly
related to the contract in question.""" "A buyer who falls behind
in 'his account' with the seller" or a seller who makes defective
deliveries of similar goods would present the other party with
reasonable grounds for insecurity.119 Failure to provide adequate




The seller's remedies on discovery of the buyer's insolvency
have been expanded by section 2-702. The seller's right to with-
115. CoDE § 2-612(2).
116. CoD § 2-603(1). The buyer's compliance with this section is meas-
ured by a standard of good faith. CoDns § 2-603(3).
117. CoDE § 2-608(3).
118. CODE § 2-609, comment 3.
119. Ibid.
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hold delivery except for cash is continued. In addition, he is given
a right to reclaim the goods provided he makes a demand for
reclamation within ten days of the buyer's receipt of the goods.
This demand must be made, even if the seller will not retake
possession of the goods until later. However, if the buyer misrepre-
sented his solvency in writing within three months before de-
livery, the seller's right to reclaim is not restricted by this ten
day limitation. The seller's right to reclaim is cut off by a buyer
in the ordinary course of business or a lien creditor. The latter has
been construed to include a trustee in bankruptcy.2
Other remedies available to the seller are indexed in section
2-703. Unlike the seller's right to reclaim the goods, which, if
successful, excludes other remedies, these remedies are cumulative.
The Code rejects the doctrine of election of remedies "as a funda-
mental policy." Whether there is an election of remedies "depends
... upon the facts of the individual case."'' In general, the reme-
dies included in this section are similar to the remedies available
under the Uniform Sales Act. They are to "be liberally adminis-
tered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good
a position as if the other party had fully performed ... "m
Under the Uniform Sales Act if the seller completed the goods
after the buyer's breach he ran the risk that a court would deny
recovery for the costs of completion because he failed to mitigate
damages.1 3 Under the Code if goods are only partially completed
when the buyer breaches, a seller may, if commercially reasonable,
complete the goods to avoid loss.' 4 The buyer has the burden of
proving that the seller's action was not commercially reasonable. 5
The seller's right to stop goods in transit is extended beyond the
situation where the buyer is insolvent. He may stop delivery when
"the buyer repudiates or fails to make a payment due before de-
livery," but only of shipments in carload, truckload, planeload or
larger quantities." This right is available to anyone "in the posi-
tion of a seller," including a person holding a security interest in
the goods, 127 and it extends to goods in the possession of a carrier
or other bailee.
120. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960), applying the definition
contained in § 9-301(3). See Corman, supra note 73, at 47-48, for criticism of
this decision.
121. CODE § 2-703, comment 1.
122. CODE § 1-106(1).
123. ENN-. STUDy 188; SALEs AN Bux SALms 155-57.
124. CODE § 2-704(2).
125. CODE § 2-704, comment 2.
126. CODE § 2-705(1).
127. CODE § 2-707.
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The seller's right to resell upon the buyer's breach is extended
not only to enforce the unpaid seller's lien, but also to fix the
measure of his damages. 2 ' Where the seller resells the goods "in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner," the resale
price determines the seller's damages rather than being merely
evidence thereof. 2 9 His damages will be the difference between
this price and the contract price, plus incidental damages, less
expenses saved by reason of the breach. Unless prohibited by the
agreement, the sale may be a private one. If the sale is private,
the seller must give the buyer reasonable notice of his intention to
resell. If the sale is public, he must give notice of the time and
place of sale, unless the goods are perishable or will decline in
value speedily. The seller is explicitly given the right to buy at a
public sale and probably has this right at a private sale. 30
The seller's action for the price is not dependent upon the pass-
age of title, but is allowed in situations where the buyer has ac-
cepted the goods, where conforming goods are lost or damaged after
risk of loss has passed to the buyer, and where the seller would be
unable to resell goods identified to the contract.'3 ' The action is in
reality one for specific performance, so the seller must hold the
goods for the buyer's account. If the seller is able to resell the
goods, he may do so anytime before collection of the judgment,
but he must credit the proceeds to the buyer.13
2
B. Buyer's Remedies
The buyer's remedies upon breach, indexed in section 2-711,
are also expanded. He has a right to obtain goods identified to
the contract if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days of
receipt of the first installment of the price.' 3 Formerly, the buyer
could obtain the goods only if title had passed to him.'34 He is
given the iight to "cover" or obtain substitute goods and, if he
acts in good faith, recover as damages the difference between the
contract price and the cover price, plus his consequential dam-
ages.'3 5 The measure of damages for nondelivery remains the
difference between the market price and the contract price, but
the time for measuring the market price is changed to the time
128. Mn. STMY 193.
129. CODE § 2-706(l).
180. See SALEs . BUix SALS 151.
131. See CoDE § 2-709(1).
182. CODE § 2-709(2).
183. CODE §§ 2-711(2) (a); 2-502(1).
134. Mum. SUDY 201-02; SALES Am Bur SALEs 141.
135. CODE § 2-712.
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when the buyer learns of the breach rather than the time of de-
livery.136
The buyer's right to specific performance or replevin is liberal-
ized by section 2-716. The requirement that the goods must be
specific or ascertained is eliminated. Specific performance is now
allowed "where the goods are unique or in other proper circum-
stances. 13 7 Uniqueness depends on the "total situation which
characterizes the contract" and may encompass requirements con-
tracts as well as heirlooms.3 s Other proper circumstances may
include situations where the buyer is unable to cover. 39 Under
the Uniform Sales Act the buyer could replevy only if the prop-
erty in the goods had passed to him. The Code avoids the problem
of determining whether property has passed and permits replevin
whenever he is unable to cover. If he can cover he has no need for
replevin.140
C. Statute of Limitations
A uniform statute of limitations of four years is provided by
section 2-725, and should simplify matters with regard to inter-
state transactions. This period applies to all breaches, including
warranties. The parties may shorten the time period to not less
than one year in the original agreement, but they may not ex-
tend it.
ARTICLE 6. BULK TRANSFERS
Article 6 simplifies and makes uniform the various state laws
designed to prevent fraudulent bulk transfers. It makes several
changes in the present Minnesota bulk sales law.141 The focus of
article 6 is on the area where the risk of a fraudulent bulk sale is
the greatest, those businesses where unsecured credit is commonly
extended on the strength of a stock of merchandise.'2 Conse-
quently, a number of bulk transfers are now excluded from the
bulk sales law. In addition, section 6-103 describes certain bulk
136. CODE § 2-713(1).
137. CODE § 2-716(1).
138. CODE § 2-716, comment 2.
139. Ibid.
140. SALES AND BuLz SALJs 145. The Minnesota Study refers to § 2-716
as restricting the buyer's right of replevin. Mm. STUny 210. Properly viewed,
however, the Code is more liberal; it allows the buyer to replevy whenever he
would need to - when he is unable to cover - regardless of title considerations.
141. ANlo. STAT. § 513.18 (1961).
142. CODE § 6-102, comment 2.
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transfers that are excluded from article 6. Compliance with article
6 is required only if a transfer qualifies as a bulk transfer and is
not excepted by section 6-103.
A. What Constitutes a Bulk Transfer
Three factors determine whether a bulk transfer must comply
with article 6.JQ First, the transfer must be outside of the ordi-
nary course of the seller's business. This does not differ from the
present law. 44 Second, the transfer must consist of "a major
part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory
of an enterprise .... ,14' The Code does not define what is a
"major part," but most commentators believe that more than fifty
per cent is meant. 46 Third, the transferor's principal business
must consist of the sale of merchandise from stock. This definition
would encompass a retail store but not a business providing serv-
ices such as a barber shop.'47 If there is a bulk transfer of inven-
tory, an accompanying transfer of equipment will be subject to
article 6 if the transfer is of a substantial part of the equipment.148
Here, "substantial part" may well be less than fifty per cent. 4
B. Compliance with Article 6
Failure to comply with the provisions of the present bulk sales
law makes the sale presumptively fraudulent.15° The transferee
may, by a showing of good faith, overcome this presumption and
defeat the claims of the transferor's creditors. The effect of non-
compliance is more severe under the Code. Under section 6-104
a noncomplying transfer is "ineffective" against creditors of the
transferor regardless of the good faith of the transferee.' Al-
though the procedure for compliance tends to be cumbersome, the
result of noncompliance makes it desirable in most cases. 52
The main requirements of article 6 are similar to the present
143. See CODE § 6-102.
144. See MinN. STAT. § 513.18 (1961).
145. CODE § 6-102(1).
146. MINN. STUDY 584; SALES AND BuLxK SALES 166; Willier & Hart, A
Practical Approach to Article 6: Bulk Transfers, in UrnmOmt CozaEnaciAL.
CODE CO-ORDINATOR ANNOTATED 461, 466 (Boston College Industrial & Com-
mercial Law Review ed. 1963).
147. CODE § 6-102, comment 2.
148. CODE § 6-102(2).
149. SALES AND Bur SALEs 166.
150. See MN1x. STAT. § 513.18 (1961).
151. CODE § 6-104, comment 2; MiI-N. STUDY 588.
152. The Transactional Guide suggests several alternatives to compli-
ance including: obtaining waivers from creditors; use of a bond to cover the
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bulk sales law. An inventory of the property and a list of the
transferor's creditors must be prepared and notice of the transfer
sent to all creditors. The inventory and the list of creditors have
to be preserved for six months and available for inspection by
creditors unless they are filed with the Secretary of State. The list
of creditors must be sworn to by the transferor, but errors or omis-
sions in the list will not render the transfer ineffective, unless the
transferee has knowledge of them. 53 In view of the priority given
to federal tax liens, it is wise to routinely send notices of the
transfer to the Internal Revenue Service, as well as state and local
taxing authorities, even if it is not listed as a creditor by the
transferor. Notice must be sent to the creditor at least ten days
before the transferee takes possession or makes payment, which-
ever occurs first,154 rather than five days before the sale.
The Code is more explicit than the present law with regard to
the contents of the notice and the manner of service. Section 6-107
prescribes the contents in detail; it should be followed exactly. If
the debts of the transferor are not to be paid in full as they fall
due, further detail regarding the nature of the transfer, the
amount of the consideration and the time and place of payment
must be given. The notice must be delivered personally or sent
by registered or certified mail to all creditors shown on the list
furnished by the transferor.
The transferee has fulfilled his obligation if proper notice is
served on the creditors. He has no duty to apply the proceeds to
the debts of the transferor. 5 However, if the transfer is an inter-
state transaction, the law of the state where the property is situ-
ated may govern.'516 Therefore, that state's law must be consulted
to determine whether the proceeds must be held for the benefit
of the transferor's creditors.
Auction sales are specifically subjected to the requirements of
article 6, but the duty of compliance is placed on the auctioneer,
who is made liable to the creditors of the transferor up to the net
proceeds of the auction. 5 The auction sale itself is not rendered
ineffective by noncompliance.
A short, six month statute of limitations is imposed unless the
claims of creditors; placing the proceeds of the transfer in escrow; or relying
on the transferor to pay his debts as they come due, but concludes that "in
most cases . . . the transferor will be well advised to comply with the pro-
cedures of article 6." TRANSACTiONAL Gumn 844-46.
153. CODE § 6-104(3).
154. CODE § 6-105.
155. Minnesota did not enact Code § 6-106, which calls for application of
the proceeds of the transfer pro rata to the debts of the transferor.
156. Roberts v. Norrell, 212 F. Supp. 897, 900 (NLD. Ala. 1963).
157. CODE § 6-108.
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sale has been concealed,'1 58 so creditors of the transferor must act
promptly if they wish to levy on the property. This is especially
true since a good faith purchaser for value from the transferee
takes title free of the creditors' rights.'59
158. CODE § 6-111.
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